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Order of Presentation As
A Factor In Jury Persuasion
By

ROBERT

G.

LAWSON*

INTRODUCTION

Where the advocates of both sides of a controversialissue seek
to present their views as forcefully as possible, is there any advantage to either advocate as a consequence of the order in which
the two communications are presented?' An effort to provide a
scientifically reliable answer to this question was first made nearly
fifty years ago in a psychology laboratory.2 In this initial study, two
communications of equal length and of equal persuasive quality
were prepared for each of three controversial issues: (a) "Should
all men have equal political rights?"; (b) "Is the protective tariff a
wise policy for the United States?"; and, (c) "will monogamous
marriage continue to be the only socially accepted relation between the sexes?" The content of one of the two communications
on each of these issues advocated a strong affirmative position, the
content of the other an equally strong negative position. For each
issue, the individuals who were to hear the opposing communications and then express their opinions were divided into two groups.
To one of the groups the communications were presented in an
affirmative-negative sequence; to the other, the order of presentation was reversed. 3 Audience opinion was measured before and
after the communications were presented. Since the two communications on each issue were equally persuasive in content, and
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 Order of presentation, as developed in psychological studies of thought and
judgment, refers to at least two different problems. First of all, it refers to the prob-

lem of whether an argument is more effective with the strong points preceding the
weak points or with a reverse order. Secondly, it refers to the problem of whether
the first of two opposing communications is more effective than the second, or
vice versa. It is this latter problem that constitutes the subject of this article.

2 See Lund, The Psychology of Belief, 20 J. ABNORm. & Soc. PsYCHoL. 174,

183-91 (1925).
3 These two controls, division of the audience and reversal of the order of
presentation, were used as an additional precaution against the influence of possible differences in persuasive quality of the opposing communications.
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should have counterbalanced each other, these measurements
should have shown no change in audience opinion, unless order of
presentation is a significant factor in persuasion.
Under the conditions of this experiment, the communication
received first by the audience, whether affirmative or negative, was
more effective in changing opinion than the communication received second. For example, it was discovered that the individuals
receiving the "political rights" communications in an affirmativenegative order shifted their original attitude on that issue toward
the position advocated by the affirmative communication. And the
individuals receiving those same communications in a negativeaffirmative order shifted their original attitude toward the position advocated by the negative communication. The manner in
which this occurred can best be explained by use of the following
diagrams:
In Figure 1 and 2 an assumption is made that the audience used
in this experiment, prior to receipt of either communication, had
no opinion on the issue (designated on the diagrams as "neutral
opinion"). When the first communication was presented, there was
a strong shift in original opinion toward the position advocated
by that communication. This shift is represented in each diagram
by the "dark" block. But when the second communication was
presented, there was a shift back toward the original opinion, this
Net Opin. Change
Neg. Comnication

I

Strong
Negative
Opinion

Neutral
Opinion

Affirm. Communication

2d Comm.

1Ist comm.

Strong
Affirmative
Opinion

FIGURE 1: Diagram showing the Unbalanced Effect of the Affirmative
Communication when the Two Communications were Presented in an AffirmativeNegative Order.
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FIGURE 2: Diagram showing the Unbalanced Effect of the Negative Communication when the Two Communications were Presented in a Negative-Affrmative Order.

shift being represented by the "light" block. Without regard to
whether the first communication was negative or affirmative, the
second communication did not succeed in shifting audience opinion all the way back to its original position. Thus, there was a
"net opinion change" in favor of the position advocated by the
first communication.
From this early experiment evolved the communications concept that is the subject of discussion in this article. Known as the
"law of primacy in persuasion," 4 it has been formulated as follows:
The side of a controversial issue having the advantage of first
position in the order of presentation is more effective in changing
opinion than the side presented last, all other factors being equal.

In the formulation of this "law," reference was made to its practical
importance to the administration of justice:
Our form of jury trial, just as our procedure in debates,

assumes that both sides are given an equal opportunity. But
the existence of such equality is based on logical considerations, and assumes that logical factors will control the decision
of the judges or jurymen as the case might be. But our beliefs
are rarely if ever fashioned through such dispassionate
weighing of pros and cons. While the lawyer of the plaintiff
is reviewing his case and making his appeal, the belief of the
4 Lund, supra note 2, at 189.
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jurors is already in the process of formation, and they are not
to be dissuaded from their position by an equal amount of
evidence or persuasive appeal on the part of the defendant's
lawyer, according to the law of primacy, which appears as an
indubitable factor in persuasion.
Recently, concern has been expressed as to the significance of
"primacy" to the judicial process in criminal cases:
In the presentation of court cases it is generally the rule
that the prosecution presents its case and the defense follows.
If the law of primacy is operative, we would find a constant bias in favor of the prosecutions position, since it always
has the advantage of first position.6
These expressions of concern, both made by psychologists, imply
that order of presentation has never been considered an important
factor in the judicial process. In this respect, both statements are
misleading. For many years, the law has recognized the possibility
that an advantage may be derived from the sequence in which
communications are presented to a jury.7 The problem is that the
law's conception of "order effects" has been antithetical to the
"law of primacy." In regulating the order of trial proceedings,
lawmakers have always assumed that the last communication to a
decision maker is more effective than the first,8 an "order effect"
known to psychologists as "recency." 9 While difficult to ascertain,
there are apparently two reasons for this assumption. First, the content of a final communication is thought to be more irrefutable
than a preceding one, since the first advocate is silenced once his
communication has been presented.' 0 (This overlooks the possibility that prospective refutation may be just as effective as
retrospective refutation.") Secondly, the last of two opposing com5
6 Id.at 191.
Hovland, Introduction, in THE OaRE OF PRESENrATION IN PERSUASION 1
(Hovland ed. 1957).

7 See, e.g., R.
oEEToN,
TRAL TAcTrCS AND ME'hoDs 264 (1954); W. LoaY,
A CIm ACTON: TnE TAL.L 126 (1955); S. Wmss, How To TRY A CAsE 173-74

(1930).
8

See, e.g., I. GoLDsTm,

Ti.

TEcmuQUE 631 (1935); L. OnRiELD,

CRnMINAL PocnunE rnm AoREsT To A.PP._L 447 (1947); E. PUrAmbM,
ADmNSTRATioN or CRnmnNAL LAw 198 (1953).

9 See, e.g., Lana, Three Theoretical Interpretations of Order Effects in Persuasive Communications, 61 PsYcHor. Bu.. 314 (1964); Schultz, Primacy-Recency
Within a Sensory Variation Framework, 13 PsYcHoL. REc. 129 (1963).
'0
See I. GoL STmN, supra note 8, at 629; S. WEiss, supra note 7.
11
See McGuire, Persistence of the Resistanceto PersuasionInduced by Various
Types of PriorBelief Defenses, 64 J.OF ABNORM. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 241 (1962).
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munications is thought to derive an advantage from the opportunity to leave a final impression upon the jury prior to
deliberation. 2 This idea assumes that a juror's judgment is a net
result of all his past experiences, with the most recent experiences
making a heavier contribution.1 3 With these reasons as a foundation, "recency" effects have been assumed to exist, and trial proceedings were regulated accordingly.
Thus, if "primacy" does, in fact, constitute a factor in courtroom persuasion, its significance to the judicial process is considerably greater than indicated in the above quotations. Whether
it constitutes such a factor, however, is not nearly as decisive as
indicated. Recent experimentation has revealed that "primacy" is
not "an indubitable factor in persuasion," but occurs only under
certain conditions. 14 In this article, an effort has been made to
evaluate the experimentation conducted in this area of communications research, and to determine if the conditions of the
courtroom are such that order of presentation could be expected
to influence the judgment of decision makers. This effort begins
with a discussion of the theoretical explanations of "primacy"
efforts. Why is it that the first of two equal, persuasive communications, under most conditions is more effective in persuasion than the second?
2
See R. K=ON, supra note 7.
131n Miller & Campbell, Recency

and Primacy in Persuasion as a Function
of the Timing of Speeches and Measurements, 59 J. ABNo m. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1
(1959), it is stated:
Our judgments, our responses, our social perceptions, are a function of

some net resultant of the past experiences both recent and remote. To
the net resultant of the moment not all past experiences contribute
equally: the casual experiences of this morning weigh more heavily

than the comparably casual experiences of any single morning one year
ago, one month ago, or even yesterday, all other things being equal.
Were it not so, unlearning and new learning could hardly take place. But
the advantage that this morning's experience now has will dissipate
rapidly. By next month, its advantage over yesterday's contribution will
be scarcely noticeable....
Recent experimentation has indicated that the advantage which the more recent experience has over the remote experience depends upon the time interval be-

tween the two experiences. If the time interval is great, the advantage would be
great; if the time interval is slight, the advantage would be slight. See Schultz,
Time, Awareness and Order of Presentation in Opinion Change, 47 J. APPL.
280 (1963). In the courtroom, since the persuasive communications
are close in point of time, it is doubtful that "final impression" has a subPSYCHOL.

stantial advantage.
14See, e.g., Cromwell, The Relative Effect on Audience Attitude of the First
Versus the Second Argumentative Speech of a Series, 17 SPEECH MONOOR. 105
(Continued on next page)
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I. THEoRETicAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW OF PRmit.cY

For the purpose of providing a theoretical framework within
which to explain "primacy" effects, it is useful to discuss briefly
the types of psychological processes involved in successful persuasion. Generally, these processes have been categorized into three
aspects of audience responsiveness to verbal communications. The
first is audience attention.1 5 In most persuasive situations, like that
of the courtroom, the effectiveness of a communication depends
initially upon the extent to which it can arouse attention to its
verbal content. Variations in alertness and interest on the part of
an audience, and nothing more, may determine which of two communications on an issue will be more effective. After attention has
been aroused, a successful communication must cause the audience
to understand and assimilate its ideas and conclusions. To do this,
that communication must succeed in conveying to the recipients
its essential points in such a way as to "be correctly grasped and
retained."' 6 To the psychologist, this aspect of audience responsiveness is known as comprehension, and it includes "concept formation and the perceptual processes that determine the meaning
the message will have for the respondent."'17 The combined
operatior of these two responses (attention and comprehension)
determines the degree to which the content of a communication
will be learned. 18 Moreover, the capacity of that communication
to procure a momentary acceptance of its contents and to create
resistance to pressure from an opposing communication is dependent, in-part, upon the extent of that learning. Its capacity to
achieve these two objectives is also dependent upon a third type
of aidience r.esponse, most commonly referred to as acceptance.
This concept includes all the expectations related to an audience's
motivation to accept or reject the conclusions offered by the advocates. 19 Quite frequently, these expectations are totally unrelated
to the content of the communications. For example, an audience's
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

(1950); Hovland & Mandell, Is There a "Law of Primacy in Persuasion"P, in
THE OmEm
oF PREsENTATioN IN PERsuA SON 13 (Hovland ed. 1957).
' 5 See C. HovLAN, I. JAms & H. KELLY, CoM.uICAMoN .AN PMISUAsMON
290 (1953) [Hereinafter cited as HovLAN, JANis & KELLEY].

16 Id.

.

17 Janis & Hovland, An Overview of Persuasibility Research, in PEsoNA.=
Arm PmsEuAsItr
Bm 5 (Hovland & Janis eds. 1959).

18 Id

19 See HovwA.wD & KEmL.Y 292.
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expectation of being partially advised or manipulated by a communicator has nothing to do with the persuasive content of a communication, but unquestionably it constitutes a determinant of
the communication's influence. 20 Every audience possesses a multitude of such expectations which, together with the attention and
comprehension responses, are responsible for differences in effectiveness of opposing communications. Thus, any difference in
the effectiveness of two communications resulting from the order
in which they are presented must be interpreted in terms of these
three aspects of audience responsiveness.
One of the more recent, and perhaps more widely recognized,
interpretations of "primacy" is based upon the attention response.
It is known as the "sensory-variation" interpretation, 21 and can be
explained adequately only after first stating the manner in which
attention to any type of sensory stimulation is controlled. Consider the situation where a child is confronted for the first time
with an opportunity to learn and write a letter of the alphabet.
As the teacher displays this letter and explains the proper way to
write it, impulses (auditory and visual) from these stimuli are
22
transmitted by the sensory nerves to the central nervous system.
Upon arrival at the nerve center, these impulses serve to produce
"both specific and non-specific effects on [the child's] behavioral
organization."2 3 The specific effects consist of the child's overt
efforts to write the letter displayed by the teacher. The non-specific
effects consist of alertness to and arousal of interest in the external
stimuli. Production of the non-specific effects is essential to the
maintenance of attention and to the performance of the overt
task. However, if the teacher displays the same letter and presents
the same explanation repeatedly, the child rather quickly loses
interest and begins to focus, at least partially, on some other aspect
of his environment. This loss of attention occurs because the
sensory impulses from the external stimuli lose their non-specific
20
See Schultz, supra note 13. See generally Hovland & Weiss, The Influence
of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness, 15 PtBL. OPnI. QUART.
635 (1951).
2
lSchultz, Primacy-Recency Within a Sensory Variation Framework, 13
PSYCHOL. E-c. 129 (1963).
22See Hebb, Drive and the CNS (Conceptual Nervous System), 62
PSYCHOL. REv. 243 (1955); Malmo, Activation: A Neuropsychological Dimension,
66 PSYCHOL. REV. 367 (1959); Samuels, Recticular Mechanisms and Behavior, 56
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 (1959).
23Schultz, supra note 21, at 130.
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effect. 24 Simply stated, human beings are incapable of giving
sustained attention to any type of stimulus for an indefinite period
of time. Instead, they are disposed to seek a stimulation which is
different from that to which they have been previously exposed. If
this variation of stimulation does not exist, adaptation to the external stimuli develops and alertness declines. As a result, attention
is no longer focused on the stimuli, learning decreases, and "we
would expect performance, i.e., overt response to the continuing
25
stimuli, to deteriorate."
The manner in which this psychological process is used to
account for "primacy" is as follows. The first of two successive,
persuasive communications, being the initial exposure of the
audience to the topic, is perceived by members of that audience as
a novel stimulus. This leads to a high level of attention and assures
maximum learning of the content of that communication. When
the second communication is presented, it is perceived as something less than a novel stimulus and provides little variation in the
stimulation level. This is especially true if the first communicator
has incorporated into his communication refutative arguments
which anticipate with some precision the position to be taken on
the issue by the second communicator. But, with or without the
anticipatory refutation, interest in the second communication can
be expected to decline, with a resultant degeneration of the respondents' attention level. As a consequence of the difference in
attention given the two communications, the audience could be
expected to learn the first communication better, to "retain focus
on [the] first stimulus and respond accordingly, i.e., in the direction advocated by the first communication, thereby producing a
primacy effect." 26 This interpretation of the "law, of primacy"
would seem to be not totally unknown to the practitioners of the
"art" of persuasion. Experienced trial lawyers are instinctively
aware of the necessity of acquiring and maintaining audience attention to their communications. What may be unknown to them
is that their ability to satisfy this necessity is obstructed somewhat
by the psychological deficiencies of their respondents.
A second interpretation of the advantage which the first com241d.

251d.

261d. at 132.
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munication has over the second is based on a psychological concept
known as "set." 27 This is an attempt to explain "primacy" in terms
of the comprehension aspect of audience responsiveness. Its fundamental idea is that the first communication creates a directional
tendency in the audience which structures learning of the second
communication. The initial communication creates this tendency
by serving as a frame of reference within which the second communication is construed. A better understanding of this interpretation can be acquired by reference to one of the early experiments from which the "set" concept was derived.28 The purpose
of this experiment was to determine if the order in which information about a person is received influences the impression formed
of that person. With this experimental objective, two groups of
individuals were presented a series of words describing a fictitious
person. Both groups were told in advance that after receiving the
communication they would be expected to state their impressions
of the individual described. The descriptive words were presented
to the two groups in the following orders, with a short pause interposed after each word:
GROUP 1: intelligent - industrious - impulsive - critical
- stubborn - envious.
GROUP 2: envious - stubborn - critical - impulsive - industrious-intelligent.
The only difference between the communications received by the
two groups was the order in which the descriptive words were
presented. Yet, the individuals comprising the two groups formed
substantially different impressions of the fictitious person. Members of Group 1 reported that he was "an able person who
[possessed] certain shortcomings which [did] not ...overshadow
his merits." 290On the basis of the same overall description, but in a
different sequence, the members of Group 2 reported that the
fictitious person was a "problem, whose abilities [were] hampered
27

See Lana, supra note 9; Luchins, Primacy-Recency in Impression FormaORDER oF PRESENTATION IN PERSUAmSoN 33 (Hovland ed. 1957);
Lunchins, Definitiveness of Impression and Primacy-Recency in Communications,
tion, in Ti

48 J.2 Soc.
PSYCmOL. 275 (1958).
8
See Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J.ABNORM.
PSYCHOL. 258 (1946).
29 Id.at 270.

& Soc.
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by his serious difficulties."3 0 As indicated by these impressions, each
group was more influenced by the first words of the series than by
the last. This result was explained as follows:
The first terms set up in most subjects a direction which then
exerts a continuous effect on the latter terms. When the subject hears the first term, a broad uncrystallized but directed
impression is born. The next characteristic comes not as a
separate item, but is related to the established direction.
Quickly the view formed acquires a certain stability so that
later characteristics are fitted... to the given direction.3 1
Application of the "set" concept to the persuasion situation,
i.e., a controversial issue with two opposing communications, is
made with the same fundamental idea that originated in this experiment.82 With the presentation of the first communication, an
"uncrystallized but directed impression" is formed.3 3 As a result
of this "directedness," reaction to the second communication is
"in terms of the initial material rather than in terms of different
material presented after it."' 4 Stated in a slightly more unimaginative way, the first communication is received by members of the
audience with more open minds and fewer interfering influences
than the second. As a result, the first communication is better
learned and exerts a greater influence on opinion. Thus, even if
the two communications are equally persuasive in content, they
will not be equally effective in persuasion.
As indicated above, both the "sensory-variation" interpretation
and the "set" interpretation attribute primacy effects to an advantage that the first communication has of being more readily
learned than the second. Two other interpretations have been
offered, both of which assume that the contents of the two communications are equally understood and assimilated by the audience. With this assumption, the greater effectiveness of the first
communication is attributed to a difference in the degree of
acceptance of the two communications. In other words, audience
motivation to accept or reject the conclusions of the opposing advocates favors the advocate having the advantage of first position.
30

Id.

31
Id. at 271-72.
3
2 See Luchins, supra note 27; Luchins, Definitiveness of Impresion and
Primacy-Recency in Communications, 48 J.Soc. PSYCHOL. 275 (1958).
3
See Lana, supra note 9.
34 Id.at 314.
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Naturally, this difference in degree of acceptance refers to a. difference in motivation attributable not to the content of the communications but rather to the sequence in which they are presented. For purposes of discussion, these two interpretations are
entitled interfering expectation of wrongness and commitment
and self-consistency.
As demonstrated by Figures 1 and 2, when opposing communications on a controversial issue are presented, the audience
first learns one response (that favorable to the first communicator)
and then learns an inconsistent contrary response (that favorable to
the second communicator). If these are equally well-learned, the
motivation of the respondents to accept or reject one of the responses determines the relative effectiveness of the two communications. One motivational factor that has emerged from empirical
studies as especially relevant to decision making situations is the
expectation of a decision maker of being wrong. The manner in
which this expectation influences the acceptance or rejection of a
communication has been described as follows:
Even in the case of the most impressive persuasive communications, people are apt to display at least some minimal
degree of resistance if they anticipate that the issue is one
which cannot be settled in any definite way or that there are
grounds for adopting a position different from the one being
advocated by the communicator. Any cue to the fact that the
communication deals with a controversial issue would prevent
a person from regarding the conclusions as incontrovertible,
and would create some degree of hesitancy and caution.
(Emphasis added.)35
In the courtroom atmosphere, a "cue" to controversiality is built
into the system. From the very outset of a trial, the decision makers
are aware of the existence of conflicting viewpoints. This awareness
serves to engender expectations of wrongness which serve to
motivate the decision makers to exercise caution before accepting
the conclusions of the advocates. This type of expectation probably
has the greatest significance in criminal litigation. When a criminal
trial juror's awareness of controversiality is appended to his awareness that absolute certainty is beyond human reach, the net result
is a substantial fear of injustice through the conviction of an in-

35 HovLAND,

JAN15 & Kx..Er

293.
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nocent person. Even without any type of importunity by the trial
judge or the advocates, this juror could be expected to proceed
with caution in making a judgment that would affect the rights of
an accused.
The criminal law, however, has not been satisfied with the safeguards provided by this instinctive tendency to caution. Instead,
the decision makers have been provided with an additional interfering expectation of wrongness through an instruction that conviction of an accused is inappropriate unless the prosecution has
excluded all reasonable doubt of innocence.3 6 Efforts to define this
standard of measurement have taken many forms, but the most
widely used definition has been that adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States.3 7 It is conveyed to jurors in the following manner: If, after hearing the evidence and arguments, you
possess a state of mind which would cause you to pause and
hesitate before acting if the issue was one involving a serious and
important personal affair, then you have reasonable doubt.38 With
this instruction, and its innate fears of injustice, a jury is strongly
motivated to maintain a position different from that advocated by
the state's attorney. Because of this motivation, the communications of defense counsel have a higher degree of acceptability than
the communications of the prosecutor. The difference in persuasive potential resulting from this acceptance differential is attributable to the adversary nature of the proceedings and the content
of the communications. It is not attributable in any way to order
effects.
Our present concern is whether this same type of expectation
operates to a litigant's advantage as a consequence of the order in
which communications are presented. Various discussions of the
"law of primacy" have indicated that it does so operate:
At the time of exposure to a given communication, interfering expectations of potential error would presumably be
86
See generally James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. 11Ev. 51 (1961); McBaine,
Burden of Belief, 32 CALwF. L. REv. 242 (1944); Reaugh, Presumptions and the
of Proof, 36 ILL. L. REv. 703 (1942).
Burden
3
387 Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1918).
See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 865 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1966); McGill
v. United States, 848 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Scurry v. United States, 347
F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.
1965); United States v. Heap, 845 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965); Jones v. United
States, 338 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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increasedif the recipients had recently been exposed to other
communications which had advocated a different position.
Even when a highly impressive communication is presented,
members of an audience would be more cautious and less
likely to adopt the new conclusion if they had previously
learned that there are grounds for maintaining a different
position.... In general, persons vho have previously received
antithetical information and arguments would be least likely
to regard the views suggested by the new communication as
incontrovertible and would be most highly motivated to be
cautious and critical.39 (Emphasis added.)
Application of this interpretation of "primacy" to the judicial
process is relatively simple. In civil litigation, where expectations
of wrongness from non-order effects are minimal, the first persuasive communications could be expected to create such an expectation. As a result, jurors would be more critical of the second
communication, and would exercise greater caution in evaluating
its conclusions. In criminal litigation, where this type of interfering expectation exists without regard to order of presentation,
if an accused is afforded the first persuasive communication (as he
is in some courts), the motivation of jurors to reject the position of
the state would be increased. In both situations, a primacy effect
could be expected to result.
A second acceptance factor which has been used to explain the
advantage of first position is the psychological tendency of individuals toward commitment and self-consistency.40 Underlying
this explanation of primacy is the idea that after the first communication is presented, the audience forms an opinion on the
issue from information then available (the content of that first
communication). This opinion constitutes the commitment. The
unbalanced effectiveness of the first communication is then attributed to the "tendency of individuals to maintain a position to
which they have committed themselves."'41 As a result of this
tendency to be consistent, it is theorized that individuals who
have formed an initial opinion cannot be dissuaded by an equal
amount of persuasive appeal on the other side of the issue.
39 HOVLAND JANIS & KELLY 294-95. Accord, Thomas, Webb & Tweedie,
Effects of Familiarity with a Controversial Issue on Acceptance of Successive
Persuasive Communications, 63 J.ABNOMM. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 656 (1961).
40 See Lund, supra note 2, at 189.
41
HOVLAND, JAN15 & KELLEY 127.
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Whether or not these two factors (commitment and self-consistency) could generate primacy in the courtroom is questionable.
In the experimental studies from which this interpretation of
"primacy" has been derived, the commitment of the audience after
the first communication resulted from an open expression of
opinion.4 2 A commitment of this kind could be expected to create
in most individuals resistance to a counter-communication simply
because of their belief that "close daily associates expect [them]
to behave in a consistent and reliable manner." 43 In the courtroom, where the commitment of jurors prior to receipt of all communications is private, the need to maintain consistency would
not seem to be as great. However, it might still be enough to
create a primacy effect:
[T]he consistency principle as determined by open commitment is not the only or perhaps even the primary factor....
A belief may gain a personal connotation though it has never
been expressed. To have formed, an opinion and inwardly to
have yielded to its persuasive influence is sufficient to make
it seem ours and something to which we owe our allegiance."
(Emphasis added.)
As indicated by this statement, the tendency of individuals to be
consistent is believed to exist even with a private commitment. A
recent experiment, however, has indicated that this tendency is
not strong, and probably does not constitute a significant factor in
persuasion. In this experimentation, two groups of subjects were
presented opposing communications on a controversial issue. Members of one group were required to express only one opinion on
the issue, that after both communications had been presented.
Members of the other group were required to express two opinions,
one after receiving the first communication, the other after receiving both communications. To assure that the commitment of
42 Lund, supra note 2; Hovland, Campbell & Brock, The Effects of "Commitment" on Opinion Change Following Communication, in THE ORDER or
PREsmrATioN iN PERsUAsIoN 23 (Hovland ed. 1957). But see Bennett, Discussion,
Decision, Commitment, and Consensus in "Group Decsion," 8 Hum REr. 251

(1955).
43

Hovland, Campbell & Brock, supra note 42, at 32.
44
Lund, supra note 2, at 190.
45

Hovland & Mandell, supra note 14; Deutsch & Cerard, A Study of Nor-

mative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment, 51 J.
ABNORM. & Soc. PsYcHoL. 629 (1955).
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the second group of subjects would be private, the opinion which
they expressed after the first communication was anonymous.
Under the conditions of this experiment, commitment was found
to have an indecisive effect on audience persuasion. The group
required to make a commitment was influenced as much by the
second communication as was the control group. It appears unlikely, therefore, that "merely expressing one's opinion privately
. .. will significantly influence one's subsequent position on the
4
issue." 6
This inquiry into the theoretical interpretations of "primacy"
was designed to answer the following question: Is the persuasive
situation of the courtroom such that order of presentation is a
significant determinant of persuasion? Some contribution toward
an answer to this question has been made. With the possible
exception of "commitment and self-consistency," any one or more
of the psychological factors used in the foregoing interpretations
could serve to generate primacy effects in courtroom communications. For example, the first persuasive communication might
possibly have an advantage of being more fully attended to, or of
being received by the jury with less interference. Or, the perception of the first communication by the jury might possibly
serve to structure interpretation of the second communication.
Should any of these things occur, one of the litigants would have
an advantage totally unrelated to the merits of his case. However,
an unequivocal assertion, based solely on the theoretical interpretations of "primacy," that such an advantage now exists in
jury trials, would be subject to valid criticism. All theories used to
account for primacy effects have been derived from studies conducted under the artificial and controlled conditions of psychology
laboratories, which are decidedly different from the naturalistic
conditions of the courtroom. Consequently, application of these
theories to the persuasive communications of jury trials is made
more difficult. For this reason, a more decisive and perhaps more
reliable analysis of the importance of "order effects" to the
judicial process can be achieved by a careful comparison of the
conditions of the primacy-recency experiments with the conditions
under which communications are presented to juries.
46

Hovland & Mandell, supra note 14, at 21.
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APPLICATION OF PRIMACY-RECENCY STUDIES
TO COURTROOM COMMUNICATIONS

A. Experimentally Induced Primacy Experiments
Since the "law of primacy" was first postulated, and particularly
in recent years, a great deal of experimentation has been conducted
in an effort to determine the extent to which primacy effects
operate in persuasion. Much of this experimentation, in design,
has been similar to the experiment from which the "law" was
derived. Generally, two communciations on opposite sides of a
controversial issue have been used. In every instance, an effort has
been made to see that these communications have been equal in
persuasive content. However, as an additional control against hidden differences in persuasiveness, the opposing communications
have always been presented to one audience in a pro-con order
and then to a second audience in a con-pro order. With this type of
experimental design, it has been possible to measure the extent to
which the relative effectiveness of two communications is dependent upon the order in which they are presented.
For purposes of analysis, psychologists have grouped the primacy-recency experiments into two categories, the "experimentally
induced primacy" studies and the "true primacy" studies. 47 This
categorization is based on methodological differences in the experiments, differences made apparent by the following discussion,
beginning with the "experimentally induced primacy" studies.
The characteristic of these studies that is most significant to a discussion of "primacy" in the courtroom becomes apparent upon
examination of their subject matter. In addition to the topics used
in the original primacy study ("should all men have equal political rights?"; "Is the protective tariff a wise policy for the United
States?"; "Will monogamous marriage continue to be the only
socially accepted relation between the sexes?"), the "experimentally
induced studies" have involved subjects such as the following:
"Antihistamines should be sold without a prescription?"; 4s "An
atomic submarine is feasible at the present time?";49 "The
reduction of the legal voting age to 18 years-the current draft
47
Lana,
48

supra note 9; Schultz, supra note 9.
Hovland & Mandell, supra note 14.

49

Id.
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age."; z " "The federal government should provide medical care
available to all people.";51 "The federal government should require arbitration of labor disputes." 2 With such topics, it is highly
probable that the individuals who received the persuasive communications had been exposed to pre-experiment communications
on the issues involved and, in all likelihood, had formulated some
opinion on those issues.
As indicated in the first part of this article, primacy effects are
dependent in some way upon the first communication creating a
"first impression." And whether "sensory-variation," "set," "interfering expectation of wrongness," or "commitment" theory be
used to account for primacy, pre-experiment exposure and opinion
on the issue would tend to offset the advantage which emanates
from that "first impression." Whether it would be totally offset
would depend upon the amount of prior exposure and the flexibility of the prior opinion. If prior exposure has been substantial
enough to create a relatively fixed opinion, the first communication would have no chance to create a "first impression." On the
other hand, if prior exposure has been only slight and the prior
opinion flexible, the first communication would still be expected
to have some advantage over the second. These conclusions are
bolstered by the findings of the experimentally induced studies.
In some situations, primacy effects were found to exist; 53 in others,
recency effects resulted. 54 Only rarely were order effects found to
be non-existent.55
50

Hovland, Campbell &Brock, supra note 42.
512 Cromwell, supra note 14.
553 Id.
E.g., Knower, Experimental Studies of Changes in Attitude, 30 J. ABNOM .
&SoC. PSYCHOL. 522 (1936); Lund, supra note 2.
54 Cromwell, supra note 14; Hovland & Mandell, supra note 14.
5 Some of the experiments that have been categorized under the "experimentally induced primacy" label were the earliest attempts to investigate the significance of order effects in persuasion. Because of this, and because there was an
unknown number of variables in the experiments totally independent of order of
presentation, the investigations did not yield a consistent pattern of results. Some
of the later experiments investigated order effects in conjunction with other independent variables. See, e.g., the studies reported in Lana, Controversy of the
Topic and the Order of Presentation of Persuasive Communications, 12 PsYCHOL.
REP. 163 (1963); Lana, Interest, Media and Order Effects in Persuasive Communications, 56 J. PsYCHoL. 9 (1963); Lana & Rosnow, Subject Awareness and
Order Effects in Persuasive Communications, 12 PSYCHOL. REP. 523 (1963);

Schultz, supra note 13. With these later studies, results emerged which were
capable of theoretical interpretation. On the basis of these later studies, it is
possible to attribute the inconsistent results of the "experimentally induced studies"
to the difficulty of measuring and controlling audience exposure to the subject
matter used in the experiments.
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Although the conditions under which these studies have been
conducted have some similarity to the conditions under which
persuasive communications are presented in a courtroom, that
similarity is overshadowed by a very important dissimiliarity. In
the process of selecting the decision makers in a jury trial, the
court seeks to eliminate all individuals with any knowledge of the
disputed incident. No person having an opinion on the issue would
ever knowingly be permitted to serve as a juror.50 But, as stated,
these factors-prior knowledge and prior opinion-are prominent
features of the "experimentally induced studies." The importance
of this distinguishing characteristic has been acknowledged by
several psychologists:
In most of the experiments herein reported, [referring to experimentally induced primacy experiments] ...it is probable
that some prior knowledge existed on the topic under discussion. As we have seen, under these conditions a law of
primacy does not seem to be a valid principle. But it may be
that when no prior knowledge of the topic is involved, a law
of primacy does operate .... "Propositions upon which one
has already had ample opportunity to form an opinion should
be much less subject to persuasive influence." 7 (Emphasis
added.)
Because of the existence of prior opinion on the issues involved,
the "experimentally induced primacy" studies offer little help in
determining whether order of presentation influences jurors' decisions. Nevertheless, the studies are still important to the present
discussion for two reasons. First, they serve to demonstrate that
order of presentation is a factor in persuasion. Secondly, they
verify that the "law of primacy" is not a principle of universal application, but, instead, is applicable only to certain communicative
conditions.
B. True Primacy Experiments
A more positive prediction as to the influence of order effects
on judicial decision-making can be made by analyzing results of
experiments which have controlled pre-experiment exposure to
the subject matter of the persuasive communications. The "true
5

6 See Lorry, supra note 7, at 24.

57

Hovland, Summary and Implications, in THE OmE oF PREsENTATioN rN
Accord, Thomas, Webb & Tweedie, supra
note 39.
PEnsUASmoN, 129 (Hovland ed. 1957).
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primacy" studies have achieved this control. The experimentation
grouped under this category supports the hypothesis that a law
of primacy may operate where the issue being debated is one upon
which the audience has received no prior exposure. Typical of
these studies are those involving impression formation.,, The
conditions under which these experiments have been conducted
are much like those of the "experimentally induced primacy"
studies, except for a difference in subject matter. Generally, the
experimenter has prepared two different blocks of information
about a fictitious individual. One block has described the individual as having an introvertive personality, while the other block
described his personality as extrovertive. Following is an example
of the type of information used:
Extrovertive Block: Jim left the house to get some stationery. He walked out into the sun-filled street with two of his
friends, basking in the sun as he walked. Jim entered the
stationery store which was full of people. Jim talked with an
acquaintance while he waited for the clerk to catch his eye.
On his way out, he stopped to chat with a school friend who
was just coming into the store. Leaving the store, he walked
toward school. On his way out he met the girl to whom he
had been introduced the night before. They talked for a short
while, and then Jim left for school.
Introvertive Block: After school Jim left the classroom
alone. Leaving the school, he started on his long walk home.
The street was brilliantly filled with sunshine. Jim walked
down the street on the shady side. Coming down the street
toward him, he saw the pretty girl whom he had met on the
previous evening. Jim crossed the street and entered a candy
store. The store was crowded with students, and he noticed a
few familiar faces. Jim waited quietly until the counterman
caught his eye and then gave his order. Taking his drink,
he sat down at a side table. When he had finished his drink
he went home. 9
Usually two audiences have been used in each experiment, with
one of the two receiving the above information in an introvertiveextrovertive order and the other receiving it in a reverse order.
58 See Asch, supra note 28; Anderson &Barrios, Primacy Effects in Personality
Impression Formation, 63 J. ABNoRm. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 346 (1961); Lunchins,
Primacy-Recency in Impression Formation, in THE OiER OF PRESENTATION IN
PERSUASION
33 (Hovland ed. 1957).
5
9Luchins, Definitiveness of Impression and Primacy-Recency in Communications, 48 J. Soc. PsYcaoL. 275, 276-77 (1958).
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Lack of pre-experiment familiarity with the subject matter and
lack of pre-experiment opinion have been assured by use of a
fictitious character.
The results of these experiments dearly "suggest that the
nearer one comes to. achieving primacy in the sense of the first
presentation of unfamiliar material, the more apt one is to obtain
primacy effects." 60 In every instance, the first information received
by the audience was more influential in the formation of impressions of the fictitious person. To the groups receiving the communications in an introvertive-extrovertive order, the fictitious
individual was an introvert. To the groups receiving the very
same information in an extrovertive-introvertive order, he was an
extrovert. Under the conditions of these experiments, it was impossible to attribute this difference of impressions to anything
except the order in which the information was presented.
The conditions of the "true primacy" studies are unquestionably more like those of the courtroom than are the conditions of
the experimentally induced primacy studies. The most important
similarity, of course, is the absence of pre-existing opinion on the
issue to be decided. Only with this condition does the first communication have an opportunity to create that "first impression."
There are, however, some important distinctions. For example,
although the audiences used in the impression-formation experiments received two separate communications about the ficititious
individual, they were not aware of the separation. (Both blocks of
information were presented by the same communicator.) Nor
were they aware that the questions which they were deciding were
"controversial." Had these factors been known, as they are in jury
trials, it is possible that the first communications would not have
had the unbalanced influence. Perhaps an even more important
distinction between the true primacy studies and jury trials is the
relative amounts of information which the two audiences (the
experiment audience and the jury) have at the time the communications are presented. An appreciation of this distinction can
best be acquired by considering the order of proceedings used in
most jury cases.
After the jury has been selected, each of the litigants is per60 Hovland,

supranote 57, at 189.
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mitted, through counsel, to communicate to the jury a generalized
characterization of the factual incident involved in the controversy. The party instituting the action (the plaintiff or the
prosecution) has the first communication. 6 ' These initial communications are known as opening statements, and generally consist of a preview of the evidence which the litigants intend to
present through witnesses. 62 It is significant, in so far as order
effects are concerned, that an effort is made by the trial judge to
limit the content of these communications to purely factual information. Neither of the litigants may attempt to persuade the
63
jury to accept his characterization of the incident.
After the opening statements have been made, the parties
begin the process of presenting evidence through the testimony of
witnesses. As with the opening statements, the party initiating the
action has the right to present his witnesses first. However, any
advantage which he might have as a result of getting his view
to the jury first is offset, at least partially, by the opposing party's
right of cross-examination. This right provides an opportunity to
cross-examine each witness immediately after that witness has
testified on direct examination. The scope of this right is controlled by the law of the jurisdiction in which the case is being
tried. 4 Some jurisdictions attempt to limit cross-examination to
matters which were testified to on direct;6 5 others place no limitation on the right, except that the testimony elicited, like that
61

his

It is possible in some cases for the defendant to delay the presentation of

opening

statement until the other side has presented its evidence. This is

regarded, however, as extremely dangerous strategy and probably occurs very
infrequently.
See gemerallg L. STm=, THE ART or ADVOCACY 47-48 (1954).
62
See V. FRYER & H. ORENrLicnxn, CASES ON LEGAL METHOD AND LEGAL
SysTEm 188 (1967); 4 S. ScswnrrzE:, CycLopEDIA OF TRIAL PsucErr
2032
(1954). See also F. Busri, LAw AN TAcrcs n JURy TPnLA.s 319 (1949), where it
is stated:
The purpose of an opening statement, as declared by the American courts,
is to inform the jury of the facts relied upon to establish the asserted
charge, right of action or defense; to apprise it of the nature of the
questions involved; and to enable it at the outset of the case to understand in a general way what the claim is in the case about to be tried.
63 F. BuscH, supranote 62; E. Low, How To PREPARE AND TRY A NEGLIGENCE
CASE 122 (1957); L. STnRYKE, supra note 61, at 52.
64M. LADD, CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 73 (1955);
EVIDENCE 43 (1954).
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65E.g., State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 125, 145 A. 761 (1929); Wheeler &
Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Barrett, 172 Ill. 610, 50 N.E. 325 (1898); McNeely v. Conlon,
216 Iowa 796, 248 N.W. 17 (1933); State v. Bagley, 339 Mo. 215, 96 S.W.2d
331 (1936); Nadeau v. Texas Co., 104 Mont. 558, 69 P.2d 586 (1937).
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introduced on direct, must be relevant to some issue in the case. 6
Still others take a middle course, permitting cross-examination on
any matter that is relevant to the issues, except those facts relating
only to the affirmative case of the cross-examiner. 67 Under any of
these rules, and especially that which permits cross-examination
on any relevant matter, the party conducting the cross-examination
may well have the opportunity to present his version of an event
before the party who is then introducing his evidence in chief.
Because of this order of presentation, i.e., direct and cross-examination of each witness as called, it is doubtful that either party
has a substantial advantage of position. Moreover, even if such an
advantage does exist, its effect is severely restricted by the limitation imposed by courts upon the content of these communications.
Once again, courts carefully and consciously attempt to confine the
information received by the jury at this stage of the proceedings to
,purely factual data; neither side is permitted in any manner to
engage in persuasive communications.
After both litigants have presented all of their factual information, each side is provided with at least one final communication
to the jury. These are the closing arguments, and they are vastly
different from any prior communications received by the jury. No
longer are the communications factual and informative. Instead,
they are argumentative and persuasive since the advocates are permitted to draw all "reasonable inferences" from the facts and present their views as forcefully as possible in an effort to persuade
the jury to accept their conclusions.6 8 It is at this stage of the trial,
and probably only at this stage, that the order in which communications are presented has significance.
The dissimilarity between courtroom conditions and the
conditions of the true primacy experiments should now be apparent. At the time the persuasive communications are presented
66
E.g., Carter v. State, 191 Ala. 3, 67 So. 981 (1915); Podol v. Jacobs, 65
Ariz. 50, 173 P.2d 758 (1946); Ficken v. Atlanta, 114 Ga. 970, 41 S.E. 58

(1902); Falmouth v. Windham, 63 Me. 44 (1873); State v. Huskins, 209 N.C.
727, 184 S.E. 480 (1936); Sands v. Southern Ry., 108 Tenn. 1, 64 S.W. 478
(1901).
67
E.g., Detroit Nat'l Bank v. Union Trust Co., 145 Mich. 656, 108 N.W.
1092 (1906); Thompson v. Richards, 14 Mich. 172 (1866); Dietsch v. Mayberry,
70 Ohio App. 527, 47 N.E.2d 404 (1942).
, - 69 See generally J. BAER & S. BAI.CER, Caoss-EvxAm TON AND SuumIrmoN
265 (1948); C. Fm=cu, PLANING AND TRYiNG CASES 554 (1957); 2 W. HYATr,
TPEATms oN m TRIA OF CiV Am CnnmAnA
CAsEs IN STATE AND FED
L

CouRTs 1550-51 (1924); E. Low, supra note 63, at 197.
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in a jury trial, the audience possesses a substantial amount of
factual information about the issue. The audiences used in the
true primacy studies had no information prior to the presentation
of the communication. And since primacy effects appear to depend
to some extent upon first exposure to the issue, this dissimilarity
raises an important question. Could the information possessed by
jurors at the time of the persuasive communications prevent the
first closing argument from making that important "first impression"? Experimentation that is directly applicable to this question
is limited. But the two studies that have been made do seem to
provide a reliable answer.69
One of these studies involved experimental conditions that are
strikingly similar to those under which persuasive communications
are presented to juries. Its purpose was to determine "the effect of
the order of presentation of a pro and con communication on
adult subjects who have been differentially familiarized with the
topic of the communications." 70 To make this determination, it
was necessary to select a subject matter with which the audience
had had no prior exposure. Vivisection of animals for research
purposes was selected. Pre-experiment testing established that the
"subjects used in [the] experiment knew very little about the
topic . . . and hence probably had formed, at most, only mild
opinions about the matter." 71 With the selection of this topic, the
experiment was designed as follows: Two communications of
equal persuasiveness were prepared. One strongly advocated approval of the practice of vivisection; the other strongly advocated
disapproval of the parctice. The audience that was to receive the
opposing communications was divided into three groups. Prior to
the presentation of the persuasive communications, each group was
provided with a different amount of factual information about
vivisection. Group 1 was given an informational standardized
lecture of slightly more than two hundred words in length. This
was followed by a discussion about vivisection which lasted several
minutes. No direct positive or negative statements about the
practice of vivisection were made in the lecture or during the
6

9 See Lana, Familiarity and the Order of Presentation in Persuasion, 62

J. ABNOrmi. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 573 (1961); Rosnow, Opinion Change and Order of

Presentation in Experimentally Manipulated Anxiety and in Natural Familiarity
with 7a Topic (1962) (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, American University).
o Lana, supra note 69.
71 Id. at 575.
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discussion. Group 2 was given a similar lecture with only about
one-half as much information as was given the first group. There
was no discussion by this group and, as before, no affirmative or
negative statements on the issue were provided. Group 3 was given
no information about the subject matter. Each group was then
divided into two subgroups. One of the two subgroups of each
group was presented the pro communication first, followed by the
con communication. The other subgroup received the communications in reverse order. Immediately after the presentation of the
last communications, the individuals comprising the groups were
asked to express approval or disapproval of vivisection.
The influence of order effects on the response of Group 1 is
most relevant to the present discussion. The conditions under
which the opposing communications were presented to this group
closely resemble the conditions under which the jury receives
closing arguments. For example, the audience had prior notice
of a controversial issue, as well as prior notice that two opposing
communications would be presented. There was an absence of
pre-experiment opinion on the issue. At the time the persuasive
communications were presented, the audience already possessed a
substantial amount of factual information about the subject matter, and the contents of the two communications were presented
as forcefully as possible. Response to the communications was
made by the audience immediately after the last communication.
Under these conditions, all of which exist in jury trials at the time
of closing arguments, a significant primacy effect was found to
exist, leading the experimenter to conclude that "a communication
presented first, whether pro or con, is more effective the more
familiar the subject is with the topic."7 2 (Familiarity, as used here,
rei.
to informational familiarity, and must be distinguished
from pre-experiment opinion.) This conclusion is supported by
the results of the experiment. To the subgroup of Group 1,which
received the communications in a pro-con order, vivisection was
an acceptable practice. To the subgroup of Group I which received the same communications in a con-pro order, vivisection
was an unacceptable practice. Similar order effects were found to
exist in the responses of the Group 2 audience, but to a lesser degree.
72 Id.
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This experiment, along with a similar one that verifies the
findings,1 3 strongly suggests that the "law of primacy" plays a
part in judicial decision-making. However, a prediction to this
effect, without some degree of uncertainty, is not presently possible. The design for all of the experiments that have been conducted so far varies in many respects from the situation that exists
at the time closing arguments are presented to a jury. What is
needed for a more certain prediction is a study that more exactly
duplicates the conditions existing in a typical jury trial. Absent
such a study, analysis must be based upon the research that has
been done and the theoretical interpretations derived from that
research. On the basis of these two sources of material, however, it
is possible to predict with a reasonably high degree of confidence
that "primacy effects" do influence the decisions of jurors.
III.

COUNTERBALANCING

ORDER EFFECTS IN JURY TRIALS

Since "primacy" appears to be a likely factor in courtroom persuasion, the order in which closing arguments are presented to the
jury becomes a major consideration. This is not intended to suggest that order of argument has never been considered to be important. Indeed, courts have always regulated trial proceedings in
accordance with an assumption that the "last" word to the jury
prior to deliberation is the "best" word. The manner in which this
assumption controls the order of presentation of closing arguments
can be seen from an examination of the rules of procedure outlining that order. In some jurisdictions, an order such as the following is provided for: "The parties may submit or argue the case
to the jury. In the argument, the attorney for the Commonwealth
shall have the conclusion and the defendant or his attorney the
opening." 74 In civil cases, the rule is stated in much the same
manner: "The parties may submit or argue the case to the jury.
In the argument, the party having the burden of proof shall have
the conclusion and the adverse party the opening."7 5 The reason
for this sequence, and the part played in that reason by the above
described assumption, can be most appreciated if considered in
the framework of a criminal case.
73

Rosnow, supra note 69.

Ky. R. Cnmi. P. 9.42(6).
75 Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.02(5).

14

KEN~rucKy LAW JOURNAL[Vl56

[Vol. 56,

It is basic to the administration of criminal justice that an
accused is presumed innocent of the charges. Among other things,
this presumption requires that the prosecution bear the responsibility of persuading the jury that the proposition in issue (guilt of
the accused) possesses the required degree of probability. 6 This
responsibility is part of the burden of proof concept, defined as
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." With this definition, a very
heavy burden of persuasion is imposed upon the prosecution.
Having this heavy burden of proof, the prosecution is granted the
final communication to the jury prior to their deliberation, the
reason for which is reflected in the following statement:
In every state but Minnesota the final word of counsel to
the jury is given to the prosecution. This rule is based on the
logic of the situation. The party having the burden of proof
is granted the final argument. Particularly should this be true
in criminal cases in which
the state must prove its case be77
yond a reasonable doubt.
Since "final impression" is conceived to be better than "first impression," the law, in providing the prosecution with the final
argument, attempts to offset to some extent the advantage resulting
to the defense from the burden of persuasion requirement. In
jurisdictions having this order of argument, a similar attempt to
equalize persuasive potential is made in civil litigation. 78 The
plaintiff is required to bear the burden of persuasion (defined as
a "preponderance of the evidence"), and is granted the right to
have the final communication to the jury. In jurisdictions having
this order of presentation, the significance of the "law of primacy"
is obvious. If primacy effects exist at the dosing argument stage,
efforts to equalize the persuasive potentiality of the two sides are
frustrated, and an unbalanced situation is made even more unbalanced.
At first glance, it might appear that primacy effects could be
counterbalanced in jurisdictions having this order of presentation
76 See C. McCoMvncK, supra note 64, at 647. See generally 9 J. WImoIo.,
Evmmc § 2485-98 (3d ed. 1940).
71 L. O-umm, supra note 8.
78 In W. Lomy, supra note 7, at 126, it is stated:
The attorney having the rebuttal or final presentation has a very favorable
position. This advantage is further evidence of the effort to equate the
outbalance arising from the requirement of proof by preponderance of
the evidence in a case of several years earlier origin. ..
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simply by reversing the sequence of closing arguments. The plaintiff or prosecution would have the first closing argument and the
defendant would have the last. However, "primacy" would not be
eliminated by this order, but would simply be offset against the
advantage provided the defense through the imposition of the
burden of proof. This would be consistent with what these
jurisdictions now attempt to do in providing the plaintiff or prosecution with the final argument. But, in providing for this
"apparent" advantage, it is doubtful that these jurisdictions realize
that order effects are as influential or consistent as scientific studies
indicate them to be. Nothing in the rules or the legal literature
indicates that the last communication is thought to have as much
advantage as the experimental studies have attributed to the first
communication. In any event, the decision-making environment
would not be substantially improved by reversing the order of
presentation of closing arguments to offset "primacy" against the
burden of persuasion requirement. Additional support for this
conclusion can be acquired from a consideration of the functions
intended to be performed by the burden of persuasion requirement.
Fundamental to the operation of the burden of proof concept
is the idea "that the opportunity to decide finally upon the
evidential material that may be offered does not fall to the jury as
a matter of course."79 Before a jury may be permitted to pass upon
an issue of fact, the trial judge must be persuaded that the evidence presented for judgment is worthy of consideration. The responsibility of so persuading the judge is a part of the burden of
proof concept and is commonly referred to as the "burden of
going forward with the evidence."80 Once this responsibility has
been satisfied, a second responsibility embodied in the burden of
proof concept comes into operation. It is known as the "risk of
non-persuasion," ' and serves to impose upon one of the litigants
the burden of persuading the jury that the proposition in issue
possesses the required degree of probability. It is burden of proof
in the sense of a "risk of non-persuasion" that determines which
9 J. WiC1,onn supra note 76, at § 2487.
80 Id. See generally James, supra note 36; Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer
79

Theory of Presumptions, 52 MIcH. L. Ev. 195 (1953); McBaine, Burden of
Proof: Presumptions,2 U.C.L.A. L. RE:v. 13 (1954).
819 J. WiaMoRE, supra note 76, § 2485.
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of the litigants shall have the right to the final closing argument.
But this is merely an incidental function of the burden of proof
concept, as used in this second sense. In civil litigation, its
principal function is to provide jurors with a rule of law from
which to decide the dispute if they find their minds in a state of
equipoise after considering the evidence.8 2 It is defined in these
cases not as a "very high probability" or even a "high probability"
of proof, but simply that the existence of the fact in issue be more
probable than its non-existence.8 3 To transfer the advantage of
primacy effects from the defendant to the plaintiff to offset the
responsibility imposed by this rule would not improve the decision-making process in the slightest. It would simply take an unfair advantage away from the defendant and give it to the plaintiff.
In criminal litigation, the risk of non-persuasion (defined as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt) performs a more important
function. It seeks to protect against the conviction of an innocent
person by requiring that the prosecution establish guilt by a
"very high degree of probability."" To give the advantage of primacy effects to the prosecution by reversing the sequence of
argument could serve to penetrate this protection. This would
seem to indicate that efforts to counterbalance order effects in
jurisdictions having this order of presentation must be directed
not toward re-allocation of the advantage of first position, but toward minimizing the impact of first impression. Before discussing
the manner in which this might be achieved, it is necessary to
briefly direct attention to a second order of presentation of closing
arguments.
In a substantial number of jurisdictions, the rules of procedure
provide for an order of presentation different from that described
above. The following rule is representative of the order used in
these jurisdictions:
Unless both parties shall waive argument and agree that
the cause be submitted to the jury without argument, the prosecuting attorney shall make the opening argument and the
82 See James, supra note 36.
83See Morgan, Instructing the jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof,

47 HAiv. L. BEv. 59 (1933); McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32
CAur.
84 L. REv. 242 (1944).
See McBaine, supra note 80; McBaine, supra note 83.
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counsel for defendant shall follow and the prosecuting attorney shall conclude the argument .... 85
By providing the prosecution with both the first and last argument, with the defendant's argument thrust between the two, this
rule gives the prosecution an opportunity to make the "first impression" and the "last impression." As a result, the order of
presentation which it provides is more unfair to the defendant
than the previously described order is to the plaintiff or prosecution. This unfairness can be demonstrated by use of a diagram:
Net Opin. Change
A

3d Comm.

Defense

2d Comm.
S.
1st Comm.

4

.4_

.

.4..

I

Prosecution

Guilt

Neutral

Innocence

Judgement

Judgement

Judgement

Figure 3: Diagram Showing Order Effects Where Prosecution Is
Given Right To Both First and Last Closing Argument.
For purpose of demonstration, two assumptions are made: (a)
that the audience has a neutral opinion prior to the presentation
of the first communication (represented on the diagram as "neutral judgment"); and, (b) that the content of the defendant's communication is equal in persuasiveness to the combined contents of
the prosecution's two communications. Although exaggerated for
8

5 Mo. R. Cam. P. 26.02(7). Accord, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4
(Smith-Hurd 1964), as amended; S.D. CODE OF 1939 § 34.3627; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-31-1 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-228 (1957). In jurisdictions having this
order of argument, a similar rule exists for civil litigation, with the plaintiff having
the first and third closing argument. See, e.g., S.D. CODE OF 1939 § 33.1307;
Vss. STAT. A'ri. § 270.205 (1957). Although the textual discussion of this order
of presentation concerns criminal litigation, it would be equally applicable to civil
cases.

KEmocKY LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 56,

purposes of depiction, Figure 3 shows the effect of giving the prosecution the opportunity to initiate and conclude the persuasive
communications. With the presentation of the first communication, there would be a strong shift in opinion toward the position
advocated by that communication. Then when the second communication is presented, there would be a shift back toward the
original position. Because of "primacy," however, this shift would
not be all the way back. Upon presentation of the third communication, once again that of the prosecution, there would be a
slight reshifting of opinion back toward the position of the first
communication. The net result would be a greater change in
opinion toward the position of the first communication, than if
there were only two communications. Thus, the need to counterbalance order effects is greater in jurisdictions having this order
of presentation than in those having only two communications at
the argument stage. And once again, it is believed that the only
way to effectively counterbalance these effects is to minimize the
impact of first impression.
Since "primacy" could owe its existence to any one or more of
several psychological factors, the development of a successful antidote is a difficult task. However, efforts to so develop one have
been made in psychology laboratories. For the most part, these
efforts have been directed toward making the recipients of communications aware of the danger of first impressions, by issuing at
some point an explicit warning against primacy efforts. Although
this experimentation has involved personality impression formation, its findings should have equal application to persuasive
situations involving controversial issues, such as exist in a courtroom.
The experimental design selected for this experimentation is
not different in many respects from all of the other order effect
studies. The experiment most relevant to this discussion was
structured as follows:8 6 Two communications of equal persuasive
content, describing a fictitious individual, were prepared by the
experimenter. One described him as an introvert, the other as an
extrovert. The audience was selected and divided into three
8

6 See Luchins, Experimental Attempts to Minimize the Impact of First

Impressions, in TE OmER oF PrtESENTA-TON iN PERsuAsION 62 (Hovland ed.
1957).
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groups. The opposing communications were presented to the
first group in the usual manner, with half receiving them in one
order and half in reverse order. This group received no admonition against primacy effects. The second group received the same
communications in exactly the same way as the first group but, in
an attempt to minimize the impact of first impression, the second
group was instructed to suspend judgment until all information
had been received and considered. In addition, members of the
second group were warned that impressions acquired from a first
communication often carry over and influence subsequent perceptions of a second communication. Both the instruction and the
warning were imparted to this group prior to the presentation of
the first communication. The experimental procedure for the
third group was the same as that for group two, except that the
instruction to suspend judgment and the warning against first impressions were given after the first communication had already
been presented.
The findings of this experimentation have demonstrated
clearly that order effects can be affected by creating in the audience an awareness of the danger of first impressions. As was anticipated, strong primacy effects were found to exist in the group
receiving no warning. The part of this group which received the
communications in an introvertive-extrovertive order described
the fictitious indivdual as an introvert. The part which received
them in an extrovertive-introvertive order described him as an
extrovert. Somewhat surprisingly, primacy effects were also found
to exist in the second group, which had received a warning
against first impressions before the presentation of the first communication. It is significant, however, that the primacy effects for
this second group were weaker than for the group receiving no
warning. (A smaller percentage of the group two audience was
over-influenced by the first communication.) The effect of interpolating the warning against first impressions between the two
communications, as with the third group, was more pronounced.
A recency effect was created. The part of this group which received
the communications in an introvertive-extrovertive order conceived the, fictitious individual to be extrovertive, while the part
which received the communications in a reverse order conceived
him to be introvertive. Apparently, the warning given this group,
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immediately preceding the last communication, caused them to
over-emphasize that communication.
The importance of this experiment is not in the particular
results produced by the warning, but rather in the indication that
order effects can be controlled to some extent by making the
audience aware of their existence. Perhaps the best possible solution to order effects in persuasion is suggested by the following
statement: "One wonders what would happen to the totality of
primacy and recency effects if subjects were warned, either prior
to the combined communication or between the... [communications] against both primacy and recency."' ' 7
Applied to courtroom circumstances, this suggestion would require that at some point the jury be warned not only against the
danger of first impression, but also against the danger of last impression. It is doubtful that such a warning would serve to
eliminate all order effects, for some degree of primacy or recency
may be inevitable in a situation where both sides present their
views as forcefully as possible. However, a warning of this kind
should function to minimize, to some extent, the impact of the
first communication, and to develop some "interest and responsibility on the part of the [jury] to insure objectivity and a genuine
desire to reach the heart of the issue."88
IV. CONCLUSION

Stripped of its technicalities and most of its endless detail, the
judicial process in jury trials has a relatively simple theoretical
basis. Prior to the time that a dispute is submitted for decision, a
trial is nothing more than a demonstration of competing characterizations of the factual incident involved in the controversy. The
atmosphere in which this demonstration takes place is one of
contention. Consequently, both litigants are maximally motivated
to impose upon the decision makers their version of the dispute.
The litigant seeking to move the court (either the plaintiff or
the prosecution) is expected to do whatever is necessary, within
established constraints administered by the judge, to maximize the
probability that the jury will find the existence of the disputed
871d. at 71.

88 Hovland, supra note 57, at 155.
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fact. The other litigant is expected to do whatever is necessary,
within the same constraints, to maximize the probability that the
jury will find the non-existence of the disputed fact. After both
sides have completed their demonstration, the problem is left for
solution with the decision makers, who then engage in a variety of
intellectual exercises which, hopefully, consist "of processing data
through opposite logics and somehow arriving at a judgment on
the basis of these processes."8 9 The judgment that is finally selected
through these processes, no matter how sophisticated and rational
the intellectual activity, can never be more than a "better" answer
to the problem, or one that is more probably correct than incorrect. 90
Underlying this system of problem-solving is the idea that
"the logic of the individual processor [the jury,] is improved if it
is enlarged to include a maximal logic for pro and a maximal
logic for con.""' Thus far our efforts to create a decision-making
environment consistent with this idea have been expended mostly
in controlling input into the system. There are literally millions of
printed pages dealing with the admissibility or inadmissibility of
evidence. At the same time, almost no effort has been made to
discern the processes by which decision makers use this input to
arrive at judgment. The process of deliberation is an unknown
and uncontrolled ingredient in the response finally selected by the
decision makers. The purpose of this writing was to consider a
narrow, but possibly important, aspect of this process. Hopefully,
what has been written serves to pose for further consideration the
following question: Is the deliberation process of jurors, as it is
presently conceived, frustrated as a consequence of the unbalanced
effectiveness of persuasive communications resulting from the
order in which they are presented? To contend that the question
has been answered would be presumptous. Judgment as to
whether or not it should be answered is left for the reader.
89 Churchman &Eisenberg, Deliberation and judgment, in
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OprmALmr 51 (Shelly and Bryan eds. 1964).
90 The "atmosphere of the courtroom is not normally such that one can expect
to find there the truth of a situation; at best one finds only a rough approximation.'
J. MAnsHALL, LAw AND PSYCHOLoGr m CoNlFucr 5 (1966).
91 Churchman & Eisenberg, supra note 89.
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